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Abstract 
Worry refers to the experience of uncontrollable negative thoughts. Cognitive models suggest 
that the combination of negative information processing biases along with diminished 
attentional control contribute to worry. In the current study we investigate whether promoting 
a) adaptive interpretation bias and b) efficient deployment of attentional control would 
influence the tendency to worry. Worry-prone individuals (n = 60) received either active 
cognitive bias modification for interpretation bias (CBM-I) combined with sham working 
memory training (WMT), adaptive WMT combined with sham CBM-I, or sham WMT 
combined with sham CBM-I. Neither of the active training conditions reduced worry during a 
breathing focus task relative to the control condition. However, when considering inter-
individual differences in training-related improvements, we observed a relation between 
increases in positive interpretation bias and a decrease in negative intrusions. Moreover, 
increases in working memory performance were related to a reduction in reactivity of 
negative intrusions to a worry period. Our findings show that facilitating a more benign 
interpretation bias and improving working memory capacity can have beneficial effects in 
terms of worry, but also highlight that transfer related gains from existing training procedures 
can be dependent upon improvement levels on the training task. 
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Worry is a form of repetitive thinking involving negative thoughts, typically about 
future events with uncertain or ambiguous outcomes, and is a hallmark cognitive 
characteristic of anxiety (Borkovec, Robinson, Pruzinsky, & DePree, 1983; Sibrava & 
Borkovec, 2006). Excessive worry about several topics is a prerequisite for a diagnosis of 
generalized anxiety disorder (GAD), while in other anxiety disorders worry is more focused 
on specific issues, e.g. worry about having a panic attack in panic disorder (American 
Psychiatric Association, 2013). Integrating basic research on the causal mechanisms 
underlying the tendency to worry is an important step towards exploring more sophisticated 
interventions targeting worry and anxiety. 
Cognitive models of anxiety and worry have proposed that both automatic biases in 
the processing of emotional information and impairments in the control of attention can 
contribute to the cause and maintenance of pathological worry (Berggren & Derakshan, 2013; 
Hirsch & Mathews, 2012; Hirsch, Meeten, Krah, & Reeder, 2016). A tendency to interpret 
ambiguous information in a more negative or threatening manner has been related to anxiety 
and worry (e.g. Eysenck, Mogg, May, Richards, & Mathews, 1991; Mathews & MacLeod, 
2005; for a recent review see, Hirsch et al., 2016). A number of methods have been 
developed that aim to modify this bias in interpretation - cognitive bias modification for 
interpretation (CBM-I) - which allows investigation of whether these biases have a causal 
effect on anxiety and worry. Grey and Mathews (2000), and Mathews and Mackintosh (2000) 
were the first to show that it is possible to modify interpretative bias in healthy individuals 
and that this can evoke changes in state anxiety according to the induced (positive or 
negative) interpretative bias.  
A recent meta-analysis on the effectiveness of CBM-I (Menne-Lothmann et al., 2014) 
found that benign interpretation training had a large effect on post-training endorsement of 
positive versus negative interpretations. A small to medium effect was found for the change 
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in interpretation bias across training, but this effect was increased by the use of feedback 
during training, use of imagery, and the number of training sessions. Benign interpretation 
training was the only condition to show a significant change in positive interpretation bias; 
however, this training effect (i.e. the degree of change in bias) was only significantly 
different from the change in bias caused by negative training but not as compared to control 
training (Menne-Lothmann et al., 2014). Furthermore, both benign and control training 
resulted in a small but significant reduction in negative mood.  
Previous studies in worry-prone individuals (Hirsch, Hayes, & Mathews, 2009) and 
GAD patients (Hayes, Hirsch, Krebs, & Mathews, 2010) used a single-session interpretation 
bias training consisting of a combination of a homograph training task (Grey & Mathews, 
2000) and an ambiguous scenario task. Auditory scenarios of emotionally ambiguous events 
were played to individuals. The scenario remained ambiguous up to the final word, which 
determined whether the scenario was either threatening or benign. A comprehension question 
was then presented to individuals for which the correct answer confirmed the provided 
outcome of the scenario (Hirsch et al., 2009). Feedback was used to reinforce the intended 
interpretation of the scenario. For the positive interpretation training condition, the scenarios 
were always resolved in a benign manner, while for the control training condition, the 
scenarios were resolved in a threatening manner half of the time and in a benign manner the 
other half. Individuals who received positive interpretation training, as compared to control 
training, reported fewer negative intrusive thoughts after training and experienced less 
anxiety during a task designed to assess the tendency to worry (Hayes, Hirsch, Krebs, & 
Mathews, 2010; Hirsch et al., 2009).  
Besides biases in the processing of emotional information, impairments in the control 
of attention are also believed to contribute to the cause and maintenance of worry (Berggren 
& Derakshan, 2013). Broadly speaking, attentional functions can be categorized into two 
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systems, one subsystem that is involved in goal-directed, top-down selection, and a more 
stimulus-driven, bottom-up subsystem (Corbetta & Shulman, 2002). The Attentional Control 
Theory (ACT; Eysenck, Derakshan, Santos, & Calvo, 2007, p. 339) postulates that worry and 
anxiety “decreases the influence of the goal-directed attentional system and increases the 
influence of the stimulus-driven attentional system.” Research shows that working memory 
capacity and other executive function tasks share an underlying component of executive 
attention (Mccabe, Roediger III, Mcdaniel, Balota, & Hambrick, 2010) and recent work 
demonstrates a strong link between attentional control and working memory (Shipstead, 
Lindsey, Marshall, & Engle, 2014). The efficiency of central executive functions of shifting 
between mental sets, updating and monitoring working memory content, and inhibition of 
irrelevant information (Miyake et al., 2000) are impaired by anxiety and worry, thus reducing 
attentional control (Berggren & Derakshan, 2013).  
Several studies have shown that worry-prone individuals show processing efficiency 
related impairments on behavioural as well as neural measures requiring the efficient exercise 
of attentional control (Owens, Derakshan, & Richards, 2015; Sari, Koster, & Derakshan, 
2016). Individual differences in propensity to worry have also been shown to impair the 
ability to inhibit irrelevant distractors (Fox, Dutton, Yates, Georgiou, & Mouchlianitis, 2015) 
and to inhibit threat-related distractors in an emotional version of a change detection working 
memory task (Stout, Shackman, Johnson, & Larson, 2015). A recent meta-analysis confirms 
there is a moderate and reliable association between anxiety and poorer performance on 
measures of working memory capacity (Moran, 2016). The development of cognitive training 
tasks has allowed investigators to further study the effects of facilitating working memory 
capacity. Working memory training has received a lot of attention but it remains a 
controversial topic. Several meta-analyses report mixed findings with some concluding 
working memory training does have benefits for cognitive skills and academic performance 
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(Au et al., 2015) while others conclude working memory training does not improve 
performance (Melby-Lervåg, Redick, & Hulme, 2016). A recent systematic review (Koster, 
Hoorelbeke, Onraedt, Owens, & Derakshan, 2017) examining the effects of cognitive control 
training on emotional vulnerability, reports that repeated training is a promising preventive 
intervention for a disorder like depression, notwithstanding that efficacy could be improved. 
A frequently used training paradigm is the adaptive dual n-back task (Jaeggi, 
Buschkuehl, Jonides, & Perrig, 2008) in which individuals are presented with two streams 
(visual and auditory) of information simultaneously. Participants are required to compare the 
visual and auditory information from the current trial with ‘n’ trials back (e.g. 2 trials back) 
and indicate whether there is a match. Importantly, the task becomes progressively more 
difficult with increases in performance, as the level of n increases (Jaeggi et al., 2008). 
Adaptive dual n-back training has shown to increase working memory capacity in dysphoric 
individuals, with training effects transferring to a change detection working memory task 
which requires the filtering of irrelevant distracting information (Owens, Koster, & 
Derakshan, 2013). An emotional version of the dual n-back task, with emotional faces as 
visual information and emotional words as auditory information, improved emotion 
regulation in response to negative film clips, both in terms of subjective levels of distress and 
in terms of an increase in activation in frontal brain areas involved in affective control 
(Schweizer, Grahn, Hampshire, Mobbs, & Dalgleish, 2013). Sari, Koster, Pourtois, and 
Derakshan (2016) found that the adaptive dual n-back training improved attentional control 
as measured by a Flanker task and as indicated by changes in resting state 
electroencephalography. Moreover, the degree of improvement on this neutral working 
memory training task correlated with greater reduction in self-reported trait anxiety across the 
training period (Sari, Koster, Pourtois, et al., 2016). A recent study found that a worry 
induction impaired working memory capacity and this was mediated by self-reported levels 
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of state worry and anxiety (Sari, Koster, & Derakshan, 2016). Taken together, these findings 
support the proposition that impaired attentional control is associated with anxiety and worry, 
and that worry itself further impairs attentional control, turning this into a cycle that 
maintains worry episodes.  
Both impaired attentional control and the presence of negative emotional processing 
biases thus seem to be risk factors for pathological worry, and their interplay may be ‘toxic’ 
in terms of initiating and maintaining worry episodes (Hirsch & Mathews, 2012; see also 
Eysenck et al, 2007). Hirsch and Mathews (2012) proposed that in worry-prone individuals, 
negative emotional processing biases can activate threat representations in response to 
external cues or internal reminders of threat. Such threat representations may compete for 
attention with currently activated information about ongoing tasks or benign topics, with the 
stronger or more active representation inhibiting the weaker representation. In worry-prone 
individuals the strength of negative emotional processing biases contributes to a greater 
activation of the threat representation, while at the same time impaired attentional control 
may be insufficient to maintain activation of task-related or benign representations (Hirsch & 
Mathews, 2012). The strongly activated threat representation is thus more likely to inhibit the 
currently activated task-related representation, resulting in distraction and the threat 
representation becoming stronger and intruding into awareness. Moreover, impaired 
attentional control then reduces the likelihood that attention is redirected to the intended 
(task-related or benign) representation, leading to a failure to control negative intrusions from 
developing into a worry episode (Berggren & Derakshan, 2013).  
The current investigation 
While both negative emotional processing biases (e.g. interpretation bias), and 
reduced attentional control resources have been shown to contribute to excessive worry, these 
two cognitive processes have typically been studied in isolation. However, based on cognitive 
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models of anxiety and worry (Hirsch & Mathews, 2012) it seems that interpretation bias and 
attentional control contribute to excessive worry in a different manner. While negative 
emotional processing biases contribute to activation of threat representations, increasing the 
likelihood that worrying thoughts intrude into awareness, impaired attentional control reduces 
the likelihood that attention is redirected to the intended representation, leading to impaired 
control of negative intrusions once activated. The aim of the current study was therefore to 
investigate how modulation of interpretation bias and working memory capacity influences 
the tendency to worry, and examine whether these two processes have a different influence 
on the experience of negative intrusive thoughts.  
We investigated whether ten sessions of training could effectively increase positive 
interpretation bias and/or working memory capacity in a sample of worry-prone individuals 
who were preselected based on their responses on the Penn State Worry Questionnaire 
(PSWQ; Meyer, Miller, Metzger, & Borkovec, 1990). Our main research question was 
whether training induced changes in working memory or interpretation bias transferred (i.e. 
far transfer) to a behavioural measure of the tendency to worry. For the working memory 
training we used an adaptive dual n-back task (Jaeggi et al., 2008; Sari, Koster, Pourtois, et 
al., 2016), while for the CBM-I training we used an ambiguous scenario task (Hayes et al., 
2010; Hirsch et al., 2009). Participants in a control training condition (control condition) 
received a combination of sham working memory training and sham CBM-I. An active 
working memory training condition (WMT condition) received adaptive working memory 
training along with sham CBM-I, while participants in the active cognitive bias modification 
training condition (CBM-I condition) received active CBM-I and sham working memory 
training. Based on previous studies (Jaeggi et al., 2008; Owens et al., 2013; Sari, Koster, 
Pourtois, et al., 2016) we expected individuals in the WMT condition to show a significant 
increase in the mean n-back level across the training sessions (individuals who receive sham 
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training will remain at level n = 1). Similarly, based on previous findings (Hayes et al., 2010) 
we expected the CBM-I condition, as compared to the WMT and control conditions, to show 
an increase in positivity bias during training. 
We examined near transfer of training related improvements to a frequently used 
measure of working memory capacity, the change detection task (Owens et al., 2013; Vogel, 
Mccollough, & Machizawa, 2005), and a measure of interpretation bias, the scrambled 
sentence task (Wenzlaff & Bates, 1998). We hypothesized that the WMT condition, as 
compared to the CBM-I and control conditions, would show increases in performance on the 
change detection task, especially on more difficult trial types that require more filtering of 
information. Previous research also found that CBM-I training, as compared to control 
training, was related to greater attentional control on a random key press task during worry 
(Hirsch et al., 2009). Based on these findings, we expected that the CBM-I condition, as 
compared to the control condition, would show increased performance on the change 
detection working memory task, but to a lesser extent than the WMT condition. In terms of 
interpretative bias, we hypothesized that the CBM-I condition, as compared to the WMT and 
control conditions, would show a significant increase in positive interpretation bias as 
measured with the scrambled sentence task. 
In order for cognitive training to be clinically relevant, it’s important to show that 
training related changes also transfer to measures of worry and anxiety (far transfer). We 
used self-report measures of worry, anxiety, and attentional control, expecting both the WMT 
and CBM-I conditions, as compared to the control condition, to show a decrease in worry and 
anxiety, and an increase in attentional control. Our main outcome measure was a behavioural 
measure of the tendency to worry, the breathing focus task (BFT), which is less sensitive to 
self-report bias (Borkovec et al., 1983; Hirsch et al., 2009; Ruscio & Borkovec, 2004). With 
this BFT, we assessed the experience of negative intrusive thoughts, both before and after a 
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period in which worrying thoughts were activated. This allowed us to examine the overall 
level of experienced negative intrusions, as well as the reactivity of negative intrusive 
thoughts across a period when worrying thoughts are activated. We expected that participants 
in both the WMT and CBM-I conditions, as compared to the control condition, would 
experience less negative intrusions. More specifically, we expected the CBM-I condition to 
show a general reduction in negative intrusions based on previous research (Hirsch et al., 
2009). For the WMT condition we expected a decrease in reactivity of negative intrusive 
thoughts across a worry period, corresponding with the idea that once worry thoughts are 
activated, improved attentional control can attenuate negative intrusions by redirecting 
attention to the task at hand or towards more benign information. 
In addition to investigating the effect of training condition on the BFT, we also tested 
how individual differences in training related changes in working memory capacity and 
interpretation bias influenced the tendency to worry. This allows us to explore whether 
training induced changes in the underlying cognitive processes, taking into account inter-
individual differences in training effectiveness, transfer to changes in the tendency to worry 
(see also the discussion on separating procedure from process in attentional bias 
modification, Grafton et al., 2017; MacLeod & Grafton, 2016). Across all individuals we 
expected greater increases in positive interpretation bias, as measured with the scrambled 
sentence task, to be related to overall less negative intrusive thoughts. Likewise, we expected 
greater increases in working memory capacity, especially on the difficult trial types of the 
change detection task, to relate to reduced reactivity of negative intrusive thoughts across a 
worry period. 
Method 
Participants 
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Individuals were first pre-screened using the PSWQ (Meyer et al., 1990) and 
considered eligible for participation if they had a score of 56 or above. This criterion was 
based on previous research with a college sample in which a score of 56 was one standard 
deviation below the mean of individuals with a GAD diagnosis (Molina & Borkovec, 1994), 
and in line with previous research in high worriers (Hirsch, Hayes, & Mathews, 2009). Based 
on this criterion 81 individuals were selected for participation. All participants completed the 
PSWQ again during the first test session and based on this assessment 15 participants were 
excluded from further participation as they no longer met the selection criterion. 
Additionally, six participants dropped out from the study for other reasons (e.g. 
underestimating the time investment for doing the training task). The remaining 60 
participants (52 females), aged between 18 and 40 (M = 23.17, SD = 4.01), completed the 
study. Participants were paid for their participation. The experiment was approved by the 
ethical committee of the University of Oxford, MSD-IDREC-C1-2014-106 (R44129/RE001).  
Materials 
Participant characteristics: baseline questionnaire measures. We assessed the 
presence and severity of depressive symptoms in the previous two weeks using the 21-item 
Beck Depression Inventory (BDI-II; Beck, Steer, & Brown, 1996), with possible scores 
ranging from 0 to 63. The internal consistency of the BDI-II in the current sample was 
excellent, Cronbach’s α = .90. 
The Perseverative Thinking Questionnaire (PTQ; Ehring et al., 2011) was used to 
assess the tendency for perseverative thinking. This questionnaire consists of 15 statements 
that participants have to rate on a 5-point scale (0-4), ranging from “never” to “almost 
always”, resulting in a total score ranging from 0-60. The internal consistency of the PTQ in 
the current sample was excellent, Cronbach’s α = .93.   
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To assess the different domains participants worry about, we used the 25-item Worry 
Domain Questionnaire (WDQ; Tallis, Davey, & Bond, 1994). People have to indicate to what 
extent they worry about things described in each item, on a 5-point scale (i.e. 1-5) ranging 
from “not at all” to “extremely.” Five subscales are then calculated that refer to different 
worry domains: relationships, lack of confidence, aimless future, work, and financial. The 
score on each subscale can range from 5-25. For the current sample the internal consistency 
was questionable for the relationship domain, α = .65, good for the lack of confidence 
domain, α = .81, acceptable for the aimless future domain, α = .72, good for the work 
domain, α = .80, and good for the financial domain, α = .86. 
Symptoms of Generalized Anxiety Disorder were assessed with the 9-item 
Generalized Anxiety Disorder Questionnaire (GAD-Q-IV; Newman et al., 2002). We scored 
the GAD-Q-IV using a total sum score. Items 1-4 and item 6 are yes/no items, in which “yes” 
was coded as 1 and “no” was coded as 0. For item 5 participants have to list their most 
frequent worry topics (up to 6 topics). One point was given for each listed topic and the total 
was divided by 3. In item 7 participants had to indicate whether in the last six months they 
had often been bothered by physical symptoms (six different types of symptoms were listed). 
Similarly, to item 5, 1 point was given for each physical symptom they experienced up to 6 
points, and the total was again divided by 3. Items 8 and 9 ask participants about the degree 
of stress and interference and have to be rated on a scale ranging from 0 “none” to 8 “very 
severe” and were each divided by 4. This led up to a total score ranging from 0-13. The 
internal consistency of the GAD-Q-IV in the current sample was acceptable, Cronbach’s α = 
.76. 
Training. The training task consisted of a combination of (adaptive or sham) working 
memory training and (active or sham) cognitive bias modification for interpretation bias. The 
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order of training tasks, starting with the working memory task or the CBM-I task, was 
counterbalanced across participants. 
Dual n-back training. We used a dual n-back task (Jaeggi et al., 2008) to train 
working memory capacity over multiple sessions (similar procedure to Owens et al., 2013). 
In this task participants are presented with a 3x3 grid with a cross in the centre of the grid, 
serving as fixation point. In each trial a green square is presented at one of eight different 
locations in this grid and simultaneously one of eight consonants is spoken (c, h, k, l, q, r, s, 
and t) at a rate of 500 msec. There was a 2500 msec intertrial interval. Participants were 
required to remember both the location of the green square and the spoken letter for each 
trial, and had to respond when either of these stimuli matched the location of the green square 
or spoken letter on n trials back in the trial sequence. Participants had to press “A” if the 
location of the green square matched and “L” if the spoken letter matched, and they were 
instructed to press both keys if both the visual and auditory stimuli matched. If there was no 
match participants made no response. Targets were set pseudorandomly to ensure that each 
block had an equal number of matches (4 per block) for the visual and auditory modality, and 
additionally two trials in which both the visual and auditory stimulus matched stimuli n-trials 
back. Target positions were presented in a pseudorandom order to ensure the value of n was 
the same for both the visual and auditory stimuli. Participants were instructed to try to 
respond as quickly and accurately as possible, and they received an online summary of their 
percentage accuracy across blocks at the end of each session (for each modality separately).     
An adaptive version of the dual n-back task was used as the active working memory 
training, while a version of the task in which the dual n-back level stays at 1 (i.e. 1-back) was 
used as the sham training. All participants began each training session at the 1-back level, but 
after the first block participants who received the adaptive dual n-back version (WMT 
condition) could potentially reach a maximum level of 4-back. The level of n was increased 
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across blocks if accuracy for both modalities (visual and auditory) was at or above 95%. The 
level of n was decreased if accuracy for either modality fell below 75%, while the level 
remained the same if accuracy was between 75% and 95%. Before the start of each block, 
participants were presented with the upcoming n-back level, which remained visible 
throughout the block. 
All participants who used a web link for training for the first time, completed a 
practice block on the dual 1-back level, after which participants would only have test blocks. 
Each test block consisted of 20 + n trials, and participants had to complete 15 test blocks 
during each training session. There was a 15 sec break between blocks, so the working 
memory part of the training lasted approximately 20 mins.      
Cognitive bias modification-interpretation. We used a training task in which 
participants listened to auditory scenarios that were designed to induce an interpretation bias 
(based on, Hirsch et al., 2009). Training scenarios remained ambiguous in terms of their 
emotional interpretation until the last word, which then determined either a positive or 
negative meaning. Following the scenario, participants had to answer a comprehension 
question with a yes/no answer within 10 secs. If participants correctly answered (according to 
the positive or negative meaning of the scenario), a green frame appeared accompanied by a 
beep tone, while a red frame accompanied by a buzzing tone indicated an incorrect answer. 
The feedback served to reinforce the intended interpretation of the scenario. An example of a 
positive training scenario is:  
“You have been practising rowing and want to qualify for the college team. You train as hard 
as you can and when the results come in, you are pleased.” 
The negative version of this scenario would have ended with “disheartened.” This scenario 
was followed by the comprehension question “Do you have a shot?” which for the positive 
scenario was correctly answered with “yes”, while for the negative version the correct answer 
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would be “no.” Participants in the CBM-I condition would only get positive training 
scenarios, while participants receiving the sham CBM-I version would have 50% scenarios 
with a positive meaning and 50% scenarios with a negative meaning (Hirsch et al., 2009). 
Each training session also included eight catch items consisting of scenarios that 
remained ambiguous (based on, Hayes et al., 2010a). The answer to the comprehension 
question then provides an indication of how participants interpreted the scenario, that is, in a 
positive or negative manner. An example of a catch trial is: 
“You have an oral exam. You have studied a lot for this test but some of the questions remain 
tricky. As you look into your professor’s eyes you can easily see what she is thinking.”   
This catch scenario was then followed by a comprehension question “Will you fail the 
exam?” A “yes” answer would indicate a negative interpretation of the scenario, whereas 
“no” indicated a positive interpretation. Participants in the CBM-I condition received positive 
feedback if their answer indicated a positive interpretation and negative feedback if they had 
interpreted the scenario in a negative manner, which served to reinforce positive 
interpretations. Participants receiving the sham CBM-I version received positive feedback 
regardless of their answer, thus not specifically reinforcing either a positive or negative 
interpretation. From these catch items we calculated a positivity index reflecting the ratio of 
positively interpreted catch items on the total number of catch items (Hayes et al., 2010).    
Each training session consisted of 66-70 auditory scenarios which included 8 catch 
items. Throughout the session participants were able to take a break at three time points, and 
the CBM-I part of the training lasted approximately 30 mins. 
 Near transfer: change detection task. We used the change detection task (CDT; as 
developed by Vogel et al., 2005; and used by Owens et al., 2013) to measure working 
memory capacity. In each trial, participants first saw a fixation cross in the centre of the 
screen with an arrow above it pointing either left or right (700 msec). Participants were 
16 
 
instructed to attend to the side that the arrow indicated. Following this, either two or four 
rectangles (memory array) appeared at both the left and right side of the screen (100 msec) 
and participants were instructed to remember the orientation of the red rectangles on the 
attended side. After a short retention period (900 msec), the rectangles reappeared on the 
screen (test array) and participants had to indicate whether the orientation of one of the red 
rectangles they had memorized had changed or not, by pressing either the “f” or “j” key. 
Response keys were counterbalanced across participants. Participants had a maximum of 
2000 msec to give their response and were instructed to respond as fast and accurately as 
possible. The intertrial interval randomly varied between 1500 and 2000 msec in steps of 100 
msec. 
The task included three array types; a two item, four item, and distractor condition. In 
the two and four item condition all rectangles were red, while the distractor condition 
consisted of four rectangles, two red rectangles and two blue distractor rectangles. The 
rectangles were presented on a black background, and appeared within a 156 x 288 pixel 
rectangular region. The rectangles could appear in four possible orientations, horizontal, 
vertical, 45° left and 45° right tilted. There were 64 stimuli for each of the trial types. All 
possible trial types, depending on array type, arrow direction, and whether there was a change 
or no change of target items, appeared equally often in the task. The task included 24 practice 
trials and 192 test trials divided over 4 test blocks.  
 Near transfer: scrambled sentence task. To assess the accessibility of positive 
interpretations of ambiguous material, we used a computerized version of the Scrambled 
Sentence Task (SST; Wenzlaff & Bates, 1998). Scrambled sentences consisting of six words 
were presented on the screen and participants had to form correct sentences consisting of five 
words, leaving out one word. Participants could form the sentence by clicking on the words 
they wished to use. Once they had submitted their answer they could not correct the sentence 
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anymore and would automatically move on to the next sentence. On every trial, two correct 
sentences could be formed, with either a positive or a negative solution. Participants were 
instructed to form propositions and not interrogative sentences, and that each sentence could 
be formed in several ways but they have to choose. They were instructed to work as quickly 
as possible because time was restricted. Participants had a maximum of 4 mins to complete 
the task. Furthermore, participants were given a 6-digit number to remember at the beginning 
of the task to increase the cognitive load in order to undermine participants’ tendency to 
suppress negative solutions in the task (cf. Wenzlaff & Bates, 1998). At the end of the task 
they were asked to recall this number. There were two lists of 20 scrambled sentences and the 
order of administration prior to and after training was counterbalanced.  
Far transfer: breathing focus task. To assess the tendency to worry we used a 
version of the BFT (Hirsch et al., 2009) which is an adaptation of a previously developed 
behavioural measure of worry (Borkovec et al., 1983; Ruscio & Borkovec, 2004). After 
instructions, participants first do a 20-sec practice period in which they were asked to just 
focus on their breathing. This is followed by another 45-sec practice period in which at three 
random time intervals participants had to indicate whether they were focused on their 
breathing or whether they experienced a thought intrusion. The actual task then began with a 
5 min breathing focus period in which participants were asked to focus on their breathing. 
During this period a beep tone would signal participants to report whether at that moment 
they were focusing on their breathing or were experiencing a thought intrusion. If their 
thoughts had wandered they were required to indicate whether the thought was positive, 
neutral, or negative, and to give a very brief description of what they were thinking about. A 
total of 12 tones occurred at random intervals between 20 and 30 secs. At the end of this first 
breathing focus period, participants rated their mood (anxious, depressed, happy) on a 0-100 
visual analogue scale with “not at all anxious” to “extremely anxious” (or depressed/happy) 
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as anchor points. Additionally, they were asked to “estimate the % to which you were able to 
focus on your breathing (0% not at all – 100% all of the time)”, “rate how difficult you found 
focussing on your breathing (0 not at all difficult – 100 extremely difficult)”, and “estimate 
the % of time you spent worrying during the last 5 minutes (0% none of the time – 100% all 
of the time).”  
Following this, participants were instructed to identify a topic that they currently 
worry about in their life and discuss this briefly with the experimenter to make sure it was 
suitable for the task (i.e. related to a potential negative, future situation). Participants were 
then asked to continue to worry about this topic for a 5 min period. During this worry period, 
the experimenter left the room. After 5 mins the experimenter returned and a second 
breathing focus period was completed, including similar ratings as following the first 
breathing focus period. Following these ratings, participants were also asked to rate their 
mood in relation to the worry period, using the same type of mood rating scales as described 
above. Additionally, participants were asked to “estimate the % to which you were able to 
spend worrying (0% not at all – 100% all of the time)”, “rate how difficult you found it to 
worry for 5 minutes (0 not difficult at all – 100 extremely difficult)”, “rate how stressed you 
were whilst worrying (0 not stressed at all – 100 extremely stressed), and “what % of the time 
were your thought contents – negative/positive/neutral” (0-100%). Finally, participants were 
asked to provide more extensive descriptions of their thought intrusions during the two 
breathing focus periods. The experimenter would read aloud the short descriptions the 
participant had given during the breathing focus periods and participants were asked to recall 
in more detail what they were thinking at the time. These more detailed descriptions were 
also recorded.    
Far transfer: questionnaire measures. At baseline and post-training we assessed 
state and trait anxiety with the State and Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI; Spielberger, 
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Gorsuch, Lushene, Vagg, & Jacobs, 1983). Participants were asked to rate how they feel “in 
general” on a 4-point scale ranging from “almost never” to “almost always” (trait version) 
and “at this moment” on a 4-point scale ranging from “not at all” to “very much so” (state 
version). Both versions consist of 20 items, each with a possible total score ranging from 20-
80. The internal consistency of the STAI-state in the current sample was excellent, both at 
baseline, Cronbach’s α = .93, and at post-training, α = .94. Similarly, the internal consistency 
of the STAI-trait was good at baseline, α = .89, and excellent at post-training, α = .92. 
The PSWQ (Meyer et al., 1990) was used to assess the tendency to worry for 
screening potential participants, and the scale was administered again at baseline and post-
training. This 16-item questionnaire asks participants to rate statements on a 5-point scale 
ranging from “not at all typical of me” to “very typical of me.” A total score is calculated 
ranging from 16-80. The internal consistency of the PSWQ in the current sample was 
acceptable at baseline, α = .78, and good at post-training, α = .89. 
Finally, we also assessed self-reported attention control at baseline and post-training 
by means of the 20-item Attentional Control Scale (ACS; Derryberry & Reed, 2002). 
Participants indicated how strongly statements apply to them on a 4-point scale ranging from 
“almost never” to “almost always.” A total score is calculated ranging from 20-80. The 
internal consistency of the ACS in the current sample was acceptable at baseline, α = .78, and 
good at post-training, α = .86. 
Procedure 
Participants were recruited using advertising at the University of Oxford campus and 
colleges. Individuals were pre-screened using the PSWQ and if the cut-off criterion was met, 
they were invited to take part in the study. During the first test visit, participants were 
randomized to the Control, WMT, or CBM-I training condition. After informed consent, 
participants filled out the baseline questionnaires. Participants who no longer met the 
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eligibility criterion (i.e. score of 56 or above on the PSWQ) completed the first test session 
but were told that they could not continue their participation. Following the questionnaires, 
participants performed the CDT, SST, and finally the BFT. Afterwards, participants received 
instructions on the training task. Instructions were dependent on which training condition 
participants were in. Additionally, participants performed a practice block of the 1-back or n-
back task (depending on training condition). 
The day after the test session participants started with the 10-day online training at 
home. Participants completed each full training session in one go. Every morning participants 
received a training reminder by email. The first time participants used the web link to access 
the online training, they had to fill out their participant number. The experimenter monitored 
participants’ training performance on a daily basis, and if participants missed a training 
session they would be asked to make up for it by doing the training task twice on one of the 
following days. Participants had to complete at least seven sessions of both the working 
memory part and the CBM-I part.1 During the second test visit (always 11 days after the first 
test visit) participants first completed the trait and state version of the STAI, the PSWQ, and 
the ACS. Following this, participants again completed the CDT, SST, and BFT. At the end 
participants were fully debriefed about the study.    
Results 
Participant Characteristics 
Means and standard deviations for baseline variables are presented in Table 1. To test 
for pre-existing differences between the three conditions, univariate ANOVAs were 
performed with condition entered as a between-subjects factor. We performed a multivariate 
ANOVA on the WDQ subscales. No significant differences were found between the 
                                                             
1 One participant in the control condition completed six sessions of the (sham) working memory part and 
(sham) CBM-I part. One participant in the WMT condition completed 5 sessions of the (sham) CBM-I part, but 
did complete nine sessions of the (adaptive) working memory part. One participant in the CBM-I condition 
completed six sessions of the (active) CBM-I part, but ten sessions of the (sham) working memory part. 
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conditions in age or questionnaire scores at baseline, all ps > .10, but there was a trend for 
differences in gender distribution across conditions, χ2 (2, N = 60) = 5.48, p = .081, φc = .30. 
 
Table 1  
Participant Characteristics at Baseline  
 Control (n = 20) 
M (SD) 
WMT (n = 20) 
M (SD) 
CBM-I (n = 20) 
M (SD) 
Age 22.30 (3.39) 23.85 (3.87) 23.35 (4.72) 
Gender 15 females 17 females 20 females 
BDI 12.70 (9.34) 14.10 (10.15) 13.90 (8.63) 
STAI trait 51.25 (10.59) 54.55 (8.74) 54.70 (8.11) 
STAI state 46.45 (11.45) 45.95 (12.77) 44.80 (10.31) 
ACS 46.15 (8.88) 43.30 (8.79) 44.30 (6.70) 
PSWQ 67.25 (6.22) 66.95 (7.31) 67.90 (6.47) 
PTQ 36.20 (12.66) 41.35 (9.29) 36.20 (9.75) 
GAD-Q-IV 8.29 (2.17) 8.96 (2.51) 8.59 (2.07) 
WDQ relationships 13.30 (4.70) 14.30 (4.78) 14.40 (4.21) 
WDQ lack of confidence 17.25 (4.30) 15.55 (5.84) 17.55 (4.06) 
WDQ aimless future 15.25 (4.48) 16.80 (4.36) 16.15 (5.09) 
WDQ work  16.70 (4.81) 16.60 (5.69) 19.40 (3.55) 
WDQ financial 14.35 (5.62) 13.90 (4.75) 13.30 (5.36) 
 
Number of Training Sessions Completed  
A univariate ANOVA, with training condition as a between-subjects factor, showed 
no differences between training conditions in the number of dual n-back sessions (i.e. 
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working memory training) that were completed, F(2,57) < 1, n.s., nor in the number of CBM-
I sessions that were completed, F(2,57) = 1.20, p = .309, ηp² = .04. 
Training: Dual N-back  
Data was analysed separately for the WMT condition and the other two conditions, 
given that the Control and CBM-I condition remained at 1-back level by design. Figure 1 
shows the changes in mean dual n-back level across the ten training sessions for the WMT 
condition. A repeated measures ANOVA with time (first vs. last session) as within-subject 
factor revealed that the WMT condition showed improvement in working memory, as 
indicated by mean dual n-back level, from their first training session (M = 1.96, SD = 0.37) to 
their last training session (M = 2.75, SD = 0.72), F(1,19) = 37.98, p < .001, ηp² = .67. The 
number of completed training sessions was related to the change in mean dual n-back level, r 
= .54, p = .015, indicating that the more working memory training sessions participants in the 
WMT condition completed, the greater the increase in mean n-back level.  
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Figure 1. Mean dual n-back level (with 1 SE) across ten training days, for the working 
memory training condition.  
 
To examine a change in effort for the Control and CBM-I training condition (where n-
level = 1), we examined changes in the mean accuracy levels during the first training session 
(M = 94.53, SD = 5.80 and M = 97.52, SD = 2.96 respectively) and the last training session 
(M = 95.30, SD = 4.58 and M = 97.44, SD = 2.26 respectively). A mixed ANOVA with time 
(first session vs. last session) as within-subject factor and condition (Control vs. CBM-I) as 
between-subjects factor revealed no main effect of time, F(1,38) = 0.15, p = .704, ηp² < .01, 
nor did this interact with condition, F(1,38) = 0.23, p = .636, ηp² < .01. However, there was a 
main effect of condition, F(1,38) = 10.67, p = .002, ηp² = .22, indicating that overall the 
CBM-I condition had higher accuracy on the 1-back training task. 
Near Transfer: Change Detection Task 
Performance on the CDT was measured by calculating K-scores following the widely 
used formula (Pashler, 1988), K = array size x (hits – false alarms)/(1-false alarms). K is thus 
dependent on the array size, and we calculated K for the two-item, four-item, and distractor 
condition separately (array size 2, 4, and 2 respectively). The validity of Pashler’s K is 
constrained by the assumption that hit rate > false alarm rate, and that the false alarm rate < 1. 
This led us to exclude one participant from the control condition during analyses on the CDT. 
We performed a mixed ANOVA on the K-measure with trial type (two, four, distractor) and 
time (pre-training vs. post-training) as within-subject factors, and condition (Control vs. 
WMT vs. CBM-I) as between-subjects factor. This ANOVA2 showed a main effect of trial 
type, F(2,53) = 40.57, p < .001, ηp² = .61, a main effect of time, F(1,54) = 20.76, p < .001, ηp² 
                                                             
2 Results are reported after excluding 2 multivariate outliers (>3 SDs on standardized residuals), one 
participant from the WMT training condition and one participant from the CBM-I training condition. 
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= .28, a Trial type x Time interaction, F(2,53) = 10.40, p < .001, ηp² = .28, while the 
hypothesized Condition x Time interaction was not significant, p > .05. To follow up the 
Trial type x Time interaction, we performed three mixed ANOVAs, separately for the two, 
four, and distractor trial types, with time (pre-training vs. post-training) as within-subject 
factor and condition (Control vs. WMT vs. CBM-I) as between-subjects factor. For the two-
item trial type, there was no effect of time nor did this interact with training condition, all ps 
> .10. For the distractor-item trial type the mixed ANOVA revealed a main effect of time, 
F(1,54) = 16.65, p < .001, ηp² = .24, reflecting a general increase across training conditions 
(pre M = 1.54, SD = 0.38; post M = 1.72, SD = 0.22). For the four-item trial type the mixed 
ANOVA also revealed a main effect of time, F(1,54) = 19.28, p < .001, ηp² = .26, reflecting a 
general increase across training conditions (pre M = 2.04, SD = 0.80; post M = 2.46, SD = 
0.70). Additional analyses on the relationship between change in performance on the dual n-
back training task (from the 1st to last training session) and change in performance on the 
CDT (from pre- to post-training) can be found in supplemental material (S1) made available 
online. 
Training: CBM-Interpretation  
We examined changes in performance on catch trials (i.e. positivity index) from 
participants’ first training session to the last training session. Figure 2 shows the changes in 
positivity index across the ten training sessions for the three training conditions. A mixed 
ANOVA with time (first vs. last session) as within-subject factor and condition (Control vs. 
WMT vs. CBM-I) as between-subjects factor showed a significant Time x Condition 
interaction, F(2,57) = 4.51, p = .015, ηp² = .14. Bonferroni corrected Paired samples t-tests 
revealed that only the CBM-I condition showed a significant increase in positivity index over 
time (first M = 0.59, SD = 0.23; last M = 0.82, SD = 0.23), t(19) = 3.27, p = .004, d = 1.00, 
while neither the Control condition (first M = 0.41, SD = 0.21; last M = 0.38, SD = 0.24), 
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t(19) = 0.74, p = .467, d = 0.16, nor the WMT condition (first M = 0.44, SD = 0.26; last M = 
0.43, SD = 0.29), t(19) = 0.04, p = .971, d = 0.01 showed an increase in positivity bias. The 
number of completed CBM-I training sessions was not related to the change in performance 
on the catch trials across training, r = .06, p = .637.  
 
Figure 2. Positivity index across ten training days, for the three training conditions. 
 
Near Transfer: Scrambled Sentence Task 
A positivity index was calculated reflecting the ratio of correctly formed sentences 
with a positive solution on the total of correctly formed sentences. A mixed ANOVA on the 
positivity index with time (pre-training vs. post-training) as within-subject factor and 
condition (Control vs. WMT vs. CBM-I) as between-subjects factor showed a significant 
main effect of time, F(1,57) = 4.97, p = .030, ηp² = .08, and a Time x Condition interaction, 
F(2,57) = 4.84, p = .011, ηp² = .15. This interaction was driven by the CBM-I training 
condition showing a significant increase on the positivity index from pre- to post-training 
(pre M = 0.55, SD = 0.19; post M = 0.71, SD = 0.20), t(19) = 4.16, p = .001, d = 0.79, 
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whereas neither the Control condition (pre M = 0.63, SD = 0.22; post M = 0.61, SD = 0.21), 
t(19) = 0.51, p = .619, d = 0.11, nor the WMT condition (pre M = 0.62, SD = 0.23; post M = 
0.65, SD = 0.22), t(19) = 0.76, p = .454, d = 0.13 showed a change. Additional analyses on 
the relationship between change on the CBM-I training catch trials and change in 
performance on the SST (from pre- to post-training) can be found in supplemental material 
(S1) made available online. 
Near Transfer: Summary  
The WMT condition showed improved training performance as reflected by an 
increase in n-back level while the other training conditions remained at 1-back by design. 
Unexpectedly, all training conditions showed an increase in performance on the distractor 
and four-item trial types of the CDT. In terms of performance on the SST, the results were as 
expected with only the CBM-I condition showing a significant increase in positivity index 
across training.  
Far Transfer: Self-Report Measures 
A mixed ANOVA with time (pre-training vs. post-training) as within-subject factor 
and condition (Control vs. WMT vs. CBM-I) as between-subjects factor was performed to 
examine changes in self-report measures across the training period. For trait anxiety (STAI 
trait) we observed a significant main effect of time, F(1,57) = 19.63, p < .001, ηp² = .26, and a 
Time x Condition interaction, F(2,57) = 3.23, p = .047, ηp² = .10. Bonferroni corrected paired 
t-tests, revealed that the CBM-I condition showed a decrease in trait anxiety from pre- to 
post-training (pre M = 54.70, SD = 8.11; post M = 48.85, SD = 9.85), t(19) = 4.25, p < .001, d 
= .63, while the Control condition (pre M = 51.25, SD = 10.59; post M = 47.90, SD = 9.53), 
t(19) = 2.17, p = .043, d = .33, and the WMT condition did not show a significant change (pre 
M = 54.55, SD = 8.74; post M = 53.50, SD = 9.29), t(19) = 1.01, p = .324, d = .12. For PSWQ 
scores the analysis showed a main effect of time, F(1,57) = 12.41, p = .001, ηp² = .18, 
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reflecting a general decrease in self-reported tendency to worry from the pre- (M = 67.37, SD 
= 6.58) to post-training (M = 64.13, SD = 8.98). Finally, for attentional control (ACS) we 
observed a significant main effect of time, F(1,57) = 7.19, p = .010, ηp² = .11, and a Time x 
Condition interaction, F(2,57) = 6.38, p = .003, ηp² = .18. Bonferroni corrected paired t-tests, 
separately per training condition, showed that only the CBM-I condition reported a 
significant increase in attentional control (pre M = 44.30, SD = 6.70; post M = 48.80, SD = 
8.85), t(19) = 3.67, p = .002, d = .54. Neither the Control condition (pre M = 46.15, SD = 
8.88; post M = 47.45, SD = 9.89), t(19) = 1.14, p = .268, d = .14, nor the WMT condition (pre 
M = 43.30, SD = 8.79; post M = 42.45, SD = 7.67), t(19) = 1.09, p = .289, d = .10, reported a 
significant change in attentional control. 
Far Transfer: Breathing Focus Task 
We focussed our analyses on the number of negative intrusions that participants 
experienced during the BFT. Additional analyses on other rating scales that were 
administered during the BFT can be found in supplemental material (S1) made available 
online. A mixed ANOVA was performed on Log transformed data of the number of negative 
intrusions (because of skewed data), with reactivity (pre-worry vs. post-worry) and time (pre-
training vs. post-training) as within-subject factors, and condition (Control vs. WMT vs. 
CBM-I) as a between-subjects factor. This analysis showed a main effect of reactivity, 
F(1,57) = 31.41, p < .001, ηp² = .36, indicating that there was an increase in negative 
intrusions across the worry period (untransformed pre-worry M = 1.76, SD = 1.31; post-
worry M = 2.62, SD = 1.69). Additionally, a main effect of time was observed, F(1,57) = 
29.98, p < .001, ηp² = .35, indicating that the overall number of negative intrusions decreased 
after training (untransformed pre-training M = 2.73, SD = 1.78; post-training M = 1.65, SD = 
1.33). However, there was no significant Reactivity x Condition interaction, F(1,57) = 2.51, p 
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= .090, ηp² = .08, Time x Condition interaction, F(1,57) = 0.38, p = .688, ηp² = .01, nor a 
Reactivity x Time x Condition interaction, F(1,57) = 0.10, p = .906, ηp² < .01.  
      
 
Figure 3. The change in Scrambled Sentence Task positivity index is negatively correlated 
with the change in negative intrusions (across the breathing periods). Untransformed data are 
presented. 
 
Individual differences in impact of training. To take into account inter-individual 
differences in training effectiveness on working memory capacity and interpretation bias, we 
explored whether changes in performance on the CDT distractor-item and four-item trials, 
and changes in positivity index on the SST influenced the experience of negative intrusions. 
Mixed ANOVAs were performed on Log transformed data of the number of negative 
intrusions, with reactivity (pre-worry vs. post-worry) and time (pre-training vs. post-training) 
as within-subject factors, and the change in performance on the tasks as a covariate. Including 
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the positivity index on the SST showed a main effect of reactivity, F(1,58) = 25.03, p < .001, 
ηp² = .30, a main effect of time, F(1,58) = 23.79, p < .001, ηp² = .29, a Time x Δ positivity 
index SST interaction, F(1,58) = 4.01, p = .050, ηp² = .07, but the Reactivity x Time x Δ 
positivity index SST interaction was not significant, F(1,58) = 3.05, p = .086, ηp² = .05. The 
Time x Δ positivity index SST interaction reflects a relationship between a greater increase in 
positivity index on the SST and a greater decrease in negative intrusions (across the breathing 
periods), r = -.25, p = .050 (see Figure 3).  
 
 
Figure 4. The change in performance on distractor-item trials in the Change Detection Task 
is negatively correlated with the change in reactivity of negative intrusions (i.e. from pre-
worry to post-worry) across the training period. Untransformed data are presented. 
 
Including the change in performance on the CDT distractor-item trials showed a main 
effect of reactivity, F(1,57) = 17.86, p < .001, ηp² = .24, a main effect of time, F(1,57) = 
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20.84, p < .001, ηp² = .27, and a near significant Reactivity x Time x Δ CDT distractor-item 
interaction, F(1,57) = 3.90, p = .053, ηp² = .06. This interaction indicates that a greater 
increase in performance on distractor-item trials was related to a greater decrease in reactivity 
of negative intrusions (i.e. the change from pre-worry to post-worry) over time, r = -.25, p = 
.053 (see Figure 4). Additional analyses whether changes in performance on the CDT 
distractor-item and four-item trials, and changes in positivity index on the SST correlate with 
the change in self-report measures of anxiety, worry, and attentional control can be found in 
supplemental material (S1) made available online. 
Far Transfer: Summary 
Only the CBM-I condition showed a significant decrease in self-reported anxiety and 
attentional control across the training period, while all training conditions reported a decrease 
in worry. On the BFT, we observed a general increase in negative intrusions across the worry 
period and an overall decrease in negative intrusions across the training period, but this was 
not modulated by training condition. When exploring the effects of inter-individual 
differences in training related gains, we observed a relationship between a greater increase in 
positivity index on the SST and a greater overall decrease in negative intrusions. 
Additionally, we observed a relationship between a greater increase in performance on 
distractor-item trials on the CDT and reduced reactivity of negative intrusions across the 
training period. 
Discussion 
This study aimed to investigate how training of positive interpretation bias and 
working memory capacity would influence the tendency to worry in high worry-prone 
individuals. The primary result was that neither of the active training conditions reduced 
worry in an objective behavioural assessment of worry relative to a control condition. 
Similarly, all conditions, including the control condition, led to a decrease in self-reported 
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worry. Nevertheless, there were some results indicating that active training may have 
potential in this domain. For instance, the results showed that participants receiving active 
CBM-I training showed a significant decrease in self-reported anxiety across the training 
period. Moreover, while there was no overall benefit of active cognitive training (CBM-I or 
adaptive WMT) relative to control training, there was some evidence that inter-individual 
differences in training-related improvements influenced the tendency to worry in our sample 
of high worriers. We observed a small to moderate relationship between greater increases in 
positive interpretation bias as measured with the SST and a greater decrease in negative 
intrusions in the behavioural assessment of worry. Similarly, increased performance on a 
measure of working memory capacity (CDT), specifically on the complex distractor trial 
type, was related to a reduction in reactivity of negative intrusions to a worry period. 
Consistent with previous training studies using a similar CBM-I training paradigm 
(Hayes et al., 2010; Hirsch et al., 2009), participants in the CBM-I condition demonstrated a 
significant increase in positivity index across the training period, which transferred to an 
increase in the positivity index as measured by the SST across the training period. With 
regard to working memory training, individuals receiving control 1-back training showed 
stable accuracy levels over time, suggesting sustained effort even though the task was non-
adaptive. Participants in the CBM-I condition generally performed better on the 1-back 
training task than the control condition, but both conditions showed high accuracy (i.e. 
around 95% or higher). Both training conditions remained at 1-back by design, so it is 
possible that this (small) difference in accuracy reflects differences in effort. Importantly, in 
the WMT condition we found a significant improvement in working memory performance 
(i.e. mean n-back level) across the training period, corresponding with previous studies using 
the dual n-back task (e.g. Jaeggi et al., 2008; Owens et al., 2013; Sari, Koster, Pourtois, et al., 
2016). The number of completed working memory training sessions was correlated with this 
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improvement in mean n-back level, highlighting the potential importance of training 
compliance.  
To demonstrate (near) transfer of working memory training effects to other tasks of 
working memory capacity we included the change detection task. No effect of training group, 
nor time, was observed for the easiest two-item trial type, possibly because of ceiling effects 
in performance. For the more difficult four-item and distractor-item trial types, a general 
improvement over time was observed but this was not modulated by training condition. 
Although we cannot exclude that this could be a test-retest effect across ten days, it may also 
imply that the sham training had a similar effect on increasing working memory capacity. It is 
possible that the sham dual 1-back training, in which one has to track two streams of 
information across trials, still led to improvements in working memory capacity, especially in 
this vulnerable group of worry-prone individuals. Moreover, participants were performing the 
training tasks each day, across 10 days, so improvements in attentional control resources in 
individuals receiving the sham training may also reflect more general effects such as 
adherence to a training schedule (Klingberg, 2010).  
Determining a suitable control condition for working memory training, or CBM, 
remains a challenge. If a control condition is essentially a ‘low-dose’ training version (e.g. 
CBM-I including 50% positive and 50% negative training scenarios, potentially training 
flexibility) it may be harder to detect intervention effects. However, using an ‘active’ control 
group does provide more convincing evidence of the benefits of training than a comparison 
with an untreated control group or control training with very different task demands, because 
it controls for general effects (Melby-Lervåg et al., 2016). That is, an ‘active’ control training 
will better match the experimental training in terms of treatment credibility which could 
otherwise affect (inflate) the results by influencing participants’ outcome expectancies and 
thus lead to differences that may not reflect effects due to the trained process per se (Melby-
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Lervåg et al., 2016; Mohr et al., 2009). Including additional control conditions that control 
for computer use, adherence to a training schedule, increase in task demands (e.g. adaptive 
task), etc., but train an unrelated process will be an important step for future training 
intervention research. 
We also investigated whether training related effects would (far) transfer to self-
reported changes in symptomatology and changes in the experience of negative intrusive 
thoughts as assessed with a behavioural measure. In terms of self-reported symptomatology, 
we observed that only the CBM-I condition showed a significant decrease in self-reported 
trait anxiety, and all training conditions showed a decrease in self-reported worry (i.e. 
PSWQ). Given that all training conditions were associated with a decrease in self-reported 
worry it is difficult to exclude the possibility that this reflects demand effects. Moreover, the 
average anxiety and worry scores remained relatively high after training (e.g. scores on the 
PSWQ are still above cut-off of 56). Interestingly, only the CBM-I condition, but not the 
WMT condition, was associated with a significant increase in attentional control as measured 
with the attentional control scale. Previous studies have also found improvements from 
CBM-I training on attentional control (Hirsch et al., 2009), supporting the idea that emotional 
processing biases and attentional control resources can influence each other. However, using 
a self-report measure of attentional control reflects individuals’ own perception of their 
control resources, while using a behavioural measure of attentional control or working 
memory capacity (e.g. the change detection task) provides a more ‘objective’ assessment and 
may therefore be better used to compare training related effects. 
Our main outcome measure was the breathing focus task, which assesses the number 
of experienced negative intrusive thoughts before and after a period in which worrying 
thoughts are prompted. Overall there was an increase in negative intrusions across the period 
in which worrying thoughts were prompted, consistent with previous studies using this task 
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(Hayes et al., 2010; Hirsch et al., 2009). Additionally, we also observed an overall decrease 
in the number of experienced negative intrusive thoughts across the training period. However, 
training condition did not seem to influence this. We then tested how individual differences 
in training related changes in working memory capacity and interpretation bias related to 
changes in experienced negative intrusive thoughts. This allowed us to examine the effects of 
training induced changes in the underlying cognitive processes, taking into account inter-
individual differences in training engagement or effectiveness. We showed that greater 
increases in positive interpretation bias, as measured with the scrambled sentence task, were 
related to an overall reduction in the experience of negative intrusive thoughts. Furthermore, 
a greater increase in working memory capacity, reflected by improved performance on the 
distractor trial type in the change detection task, was related to reduced reactivity of negative 
intrusions across the worry period. These findings show that a more benign interpretation bias 
and improved working memory can have beneficial effects in terms of the experience of 
negative intrusive thoughts, but it’s important to note that this was dependent upon the level 
of improvement from training. It highlights that our existing training paradigms could be 
further improved to boost training related gains which exceed (small to moderate) gains 
obtained also through ‘active’ sham training.  
The current findings show increased positive interpretative processing and working 
memory capacity could attenuate the experience of negative intrusive thoughts through 
different pathways. Having a more benign interpretation bias may generally reduce the 
experience of negative intrusive thoughts by decreasing the likelihood that external or 
internal cues activate threat representations that compete with task-related representations for 
attention (Hirsch & Mathews, 2012). If negative thoughts are less likely to intrude into 
awareness and develop into a worry episode, this will leave more attentional resources for the 
task at hand. At the same time, once negative thoughts intrude into awareness, improved 
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attentional control resources can attenuate worry by maintaining control over attention and 
facilitate redirection of attention to the task at hand or more benign thoughts (Berggren & 
Derakshan, 2013; Hirsch & Mathews, 2012).    
Although we observed that the tendency to worry was influenced when considering 
individual differences in training related gains, no effect was found when comparing training 
conditions. This highlights the difference between examining effects of changes in underlying 
target processes (e.g. degree of change in working memory capacity) and examining effects 
of the tasks employed to modify these processes (e.g. adaptive working memory training vs. 
sham training) (Grafton et al., 2017; MacLeod & Grafton, 2016). The procedures used to 
modify target processes such as CBM-I and the adaptive dual n-back task may not be 
effective to the same extent in all individuals. We found that the degree of change in working 
memory capacity or positive interpretation bias had a small to moderate effect on the 
tendency to worry. This supports cognitive models of worry and anxiety positing that, in 
worry-prone individuals, negative emotion processing biases, impaired attentional control, 
and their interplay contribute to excessive worry (Berggren & Derakshan, 2013; Hirsch & 
Mathews, 2012). Psychological interventions targeting (prevention of) pathological worry 
may thus benefit from including procedures that facilitate benign interpretative processing 
and increase attentional control resources. However, our findings also point out that the 
existing procedures as methods to facilitate working memory and positive interpretation bias 
leave much room for improvement.  
Future research should examine the factors influencing effectiveness of cognitive 
training (e.g. number of training sessions, using an adaptive component), longer-term effects 
of training, and for whom (e.g. certain symptom profiles) it works best. Especially if 
cognitive training is to be an ‘add-on’ component to intervention programmes or used as a 
preventive intervention, it is essential that such procedures are effective in causing a reliable 
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change in the underlying processes in vulnerable and clinical populations. To further test the 
clinical potential of cognitive training procedures it is important to perform double-blind 
randomized controlled trials in larger samples to increase statistical power. Moreover, future 
research could investigate whether combining working memory training with CBM-I is 
superior to receiving either training on its own. A recent study in high-worriers investigated 
the effects of combining a week of working memory training with mindfulness meditation 
practice, showing that especially this combination resulted in positive effects on self-reported 
worry (Course-Choi, Saville, & Derakshan, 2017). These initial findings are promising and 
suggest that cognitive training could work as a catalyst for more established clinical 
treatments. Furthermore, when aiming to use cognitive training as a preventive strategy it will 
be especially important to follow individuals over time to see if they develop clinical 
symptom levels (e.g. GAD) and to investigate at what stage in development it is most 
beneficial to intervene (e.g. childhood vs. later adolescence).    
The current experimental study contributes to our understanding of the causal 
relationship between interpretation bias, attentional control, and the tendency to worry in a 
sample of worry-prone individuals. Our findings show that facilitating a more benign 
interpretation bias and improving working memory capacity can have moderate beneficial 
effects in terms of worry, but highlight that transfer-related gains from existing training 
procedures can depend on improvement levels during training. This suggests there is room 
for improving the effectiveness of our existing training procedures which are not necessarily 
superior to active control training. Furthering our knowledge of the cognitive mechanisms 
underlying pathological worry and developing sophisticated training interventions that target 
these cognitive processes will benefit treatment for a range of emotional disorders given the 
transdiagnostic nature of worry.  
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